NOT AN ANALYST

Recent turmoil In the past few weeks, there have been a number of reports from different individuals trying to value GGP and unfold how much equity will be created through reorganization. There are a lot of uncertainties over how much GGP is worth and we might see a valuation battle between the creditors and the owners. It’s clear that the Committees representing each side have different views: the Unsecured Creditors will want a lower valuation so they can have a higher equity stake and the shareholders will want a higher valuation so they can retain a higher residual stake.

For those who have not been following the GGP bankruptcy story, I will offer a brief synopsis:

• As of January 25, the restructuring of 74 secured mortgage loans aggregating approximately 9.4 billion has been completed. As a result, 180 GGP subsidiary debtors owning 96 properties are no longer in bankruptcy.
• The restructuring of the remaining 16 loans aggregating approximately 2.1 billion was approved by the Bankruptcy Court in December 2009 and January 2010 and is expected to be completed in the next few weeks.
• GGP has recently engaged UBS Investment Bank to assist the Company with exit strategies and Miller Buckfire & Co., LLC as a financial advisor and investment banker.

Now it all boils down to a restructuring plan for the remaining 2,590 mm in Bank Debt and 4,000 mm in Unsecured Debt. Valuation is rarely litigated in court; usually the Creditors and Equity Committee will submit a plan of reorganization which implies a valuation of the Debtor they both agreed upon. But in the case of GGP, there might be large discrepancies between Creditors and Owner, and we might see a valuation battle between the two. The Company is contractually obligated to de-lever its balance sheet based on the loan extension agreements with the Secured Mortgage Loans. Also, the fact that all the 6,590 mm remaining liabilities could be potentially reinstated at par and still have substantial equity left, it doesn’t mean that the Bankruptcy Court will allow it, as the Judge has to make sure that the Debtor will be able to survive as a going concern through another financial downturn.

Key ingredients Let’s look at some key elements that will play a pivotal role in the valuation process:

Ownership: There is a strong bias towards generating a high equity value. The Company is held by insiders, the Bucksbaum family has a 25% ownership and William Ackman, which is Director and a member of the Board, has a 20% ownership.

Equity Committee: An honorable member is Luis A. Bucksbaum, ex-CEO of the Company, which will push for a high valuation, given the large equity interest by his family.

UBS compensation: The Investment Bank charges several fees, but the discretionary fee that caught my attention. There is a completion fee comprised of the greater of 17,500 mm and 0.33% on any amount by which the equity recovery exceeds 1,000 mm. UBS will be indifferent between the two if the residual equity is 5,300 mm or 16.6 dollars a share. This is an incentive for UBS to maximize shareholders’ value.

A Valuation Expert: If the creditors and owner cannot agree on a valuation, the Court will consider the opinion of a third party independent and credible expert. This could be good news for GGP as the positive report from William Ackman, which value the Debtor between 42 and 24 dollars a share, is highly valued and recognized by other institutions and Hedge Funds.

Hovde Capital: The Hedge Fund that highly criticized Pershing Square Capital valuation and rates the Company at 5 dollars a share will have no weight in Court. The Hedge Fund is not a member of any committee, doesn’t own any equity or debt and it’s not a valuation expert.

De-leveraging How will de-leveraging be achieved? Two of the Rouse Bonds were due in 2009, and the Company will probably repay them at par plus post petition accrued interest. The 1,990 mm Term Loan under the 2006 Credit Facility will be refinanced with an Exit Facility and the 590 mm Revolver will be repaid in full. Eurohypo AG is the only creditor under the 2006 Facility and it’s a member of the Creditor Committee. How will the Debtor come up with the cash to pay off the bonds and Revolver ? With proceeds from equity issuance. If the three remaining Rouse bonds and the GGP LP notes, amounting to 1,650 mm and 1,550 mm respectively, are converted into new common, leverage will significantly decrease and equity will increase by 3,200 mm. That would mean that shareholders will face substantial dilution, probably around 40%. Let’s assume that the residual equity is valued at 5,000 mm, an addition 3,200 mm in equity will mean a 39% dilution for shareholders.

This is an overview of the restructuring businesses discussed on the Blog, to update investors on recent developments. I would be glad to give my feedback, or receive yours, on the on any bankruptcy proceedings discussed here.

CIT Group – It emerged from Bankruptcy on December 10 and it’s now trading under “CIT” on the NYSE. As you remember, the Company cancelled the old equity and issued 200 mm of new common shares. The implementation of the Company’s strategy unfolds around CIT Banks; the subsidiary will be the focal point for the origination of middle market loans, bank deposits and other businesses like Vendor Finance (which provides leasing solutions) and Trade Finance (factoring and ABS). That is currently on hold; waiting regulatory approval from the FDIC. On July 2009, the FDIC imposed a “Cease and Desist Order” on CIT Bank, which prevents the subsidiary to grow deposits given the weakness of the institution at the time.

CIT_New_Business_Model

General Growth Properties – The Debtor is expecting to emerge from bankruptcy by the end of June 2010. There are still 3,000 mm in Secured Mortgage debt that need to be reorganized before a plan of reorganization for the Unsecured (Rouse Bonds, GGP LP Notes and TRUPS) and Secured Notes (2008 Credit Facility, 2006 Term Loan and Revolving Credit Facility) is implemented. Most likely maturities for the remaining Mortgage Debt will be postpones at higher rates and a debt-to-equity conversion will be implemented for all or part of the Unsecured Notes. Worth noting is the dividend of 0.19 dollars a share that the Bankruptcy Court authorized the Debtor to pay to common shareholders in order to maintain the REIT tax status and avoid tax penalties.

Chemtura Corp – The December MOR (Monthly Operating Report) reported EBITDA of 54 mm, which brings the 2009 EBITDA to 251 mm, well above my expectations of 220 mm. We might be able to see some equity value up to 2 dollars a share even before a POR is unfolded. The Equity Committee was appointed on December 29 and I am under the impression that the current shares will continue to trade post bankruptcy and reinstated on the NYSE, but shareholders will experience dilution (probably around 50%) due to debt-to-equity conversion and/or new offering. Read my last post on Chemtura Corp for more details on that.

Idearc Corp – The Restructuring process was completed on January 4 and the business emerged under the name of Supermedia Inc which symbolizes a new line of business that the Company launched.  The pre-emergence common stock of Idearc Inc. (which has traded under the symbol “IDARQ.PK “) was cancelled effective December 31, 2009 and the Company now trades on the NASDAQ under “SPMD”. The new name symbolizes the continuity of the old business and the implementation of new products. More details on the different business segments are highlighted in the presentation attached.

SuperMedia_New_Business_Model

Accuride Corp – A third amendment to the Plan of Reorganization was filed with the Bankruptcy Court on December 21. The last date to vote on the Plan is January 29 and the confirmation hearing is scheduled for February 10 2010. The Equity Committee has urged shareholders to strongly reject the plan, arguing that a 2% share of the reorganized Company (which will become 0.6% after dilution) is far too little. The Committee plans to object the Plan at the Confirmation Hearing, and might be able to get away with more, maybe 5% of the reorganized equity. The Committee is not wrong, given the fact that creditors are expected to get no more that 100% recovery plus accrued interest through bankruptcy, but because the proposed Plan offers a significant equity interest to creditors, the upside will be more that 100%. Look at my previous post on Accuride Corp on December 9 for more details about the POR and dilution.

Chemtura Corp is expected to come up with a plan of reorganization in the next three months and emerge from bankruptcy by the middle of 2010. I am proposing a potential plan of reorganization that sees part of the Unsecured Notes reinstated and a 550 mm Exit Facility. In my previous post, I highlighted how the Company needed to generate 2010 EBITDA>270 mm to have equity value. Now, I recognize that the 4.5x multiple used was probably too conservative, therefore with a multiple of 6.00x and with a lower 2010 EBITDA forecast, there can be some equity value.

2009 Developments

Term of the DIP Loan – 250 mm Term Loan, 64 mm Revolving Credit and 86 mm Revolver that will be converted in a Term Loan once the Company exits bankruptcy

DIP Fees – Around 10.5% for the 250 mm Term Loan and 64 mm Revolver; around 6.5% for the 86 mm Revolver. There is a 1.5% unused fee for the unused portion of the Revolving Credit average balance, a 2% exit fee on the 86 mm payable to the lenders and 3% exit fee on all other commitments. The DIP Loan matures in March 18 2010

DIP Term Balance – 165 mm of the Term Loan was used in March to fully terminate the US Receivable Facility and to fund working capital. The remaining 85 mm of the Term Loan was used in April to fund certain outstanding amounts owed to Secured Creditors under the amended 2007 Credit Facility.

Assumptions

Emergence from BK – Before the end of 2010, probably around the 3Q of 2010

PVC additive business – The transaction will generate 45 mm in cash, capital expenditures will be reduced by 18% or 13 mm, which is the percentage of PVC sales to the total segment sales, and EBITDA will be reduced by 10% or 21 mm, which is a percentage of the PVC sales to total sales.

Capital expenditures – The Debtor will incur 45 mm in capital expenditures in 2009 and 2010, which includes a reduction due to the PVC additive business sale. The 8K on February 29 indicated that the company wanted to keep cap ex below 60 mm for 2009.

Working Capital – The Debtor will generate 20 mm in cash from reduction of working capital in 2009 and 30 mm in 2010 due to continuing effort to reduce inventories and account receivables. In 2011 and 2012 working capital requirement will be 20 mm and 40 mm

Potential Plan of Reorganization

Exit Facility – A 550 mm Term Loan with 50 mm amortization schedule each year. The loan will be fully amortized in 11 years.

DIP Loan –The 250 mm Term Loan will be repaid with proceeds from the Exit Facility, cash on hands and cash generated from operations. The 86 mm Revolver will become available as a new line of credit

Credit Facility – The 151 mm balance of the 2007 Credit Facility will be repaid in full using proceeds from the Exit Facility, cash on hands and cash generated from operations.

370 mm Senior Unsecured due 2009 – The Debtor will repurchase them at par plus accrued interest using proceeds from the Exit Facility, cash on hands and cash generated from operations.

500 mm Senior Unsecured due 2016 – The Notes will be reinstated and accrued interest will be paid.

150 mm Debentures due 2026 – The Notes will be converted into a 1.50% coupon mandatory Convertible Note. I assume that 80 mm will be converted in 2011 and the remaining 70 mm in 2012

Capitalization Upon emergence, the Debtor will have a 1,200 mm in debt comprised of a 550 mm Exit Term Loan Facility with an amortization schedule, an 85 mm unused Revolver balance, 500 mm in Unsecured Debt and 150 mm Convertible Note. The latter will be converted into equity by the end of 2012, bringing the debt level down to 950 mm. The end cash level in 2010 will be 116 mm; debt/EBITDA will be 5.4 and 3.2 in 2010 and 2012 respectively. Financial covenants under the Exit Facility should contain a minimum EBITDA of 190 mm per year and a minimum cash balance of 80 mm each month. Now, I am under the impression that the 2016 and 2026 Notes can be reinstated, given the fact that default on these notes was triggered only by cross-default provision included in the indenture governing them, and not by breach of their financial covenants. In order words, the default on the 2016 and 2026 Notes was the result of non-compliance with the covenants under more Senior debt, the Amended Credit Facility. It was likely that the Company couldn’t repay or refinance the 370 mm 2009 Notes due in July; therefore I anticipate that they will be repurchased at par plus accrued interest. Under this scenario I see little equity value in 2010, but can potentially appreciate to 4 dollars a share within one or two years after emergence. I am also attaching a link to an interesting article that I found on another Blog regarding reinstating the Chemtura’s Unsecured debt. Enjoy and I would greatly appreciate your feedback.

http://chemturaresearch.blogspot.com/2010/01/could-chemtura-reinstate-certain-debt.html

Idearc, one of the largest publishers of yellow pages directories in the United States and leading online search providers, is expecting to emerge from bankruptcy by the end of the year. The Company filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 on March 31^st, blaming the downturn in the economy, a shift in advertising demand from print to online, and a high debt levels as result of the spin off from Verizon Communication in 2006. The Court approved the amended Plan of Reorganization on December 22, 2009.

Creation of Idearc The Company was formed in 2006 as a spin-off from Verizon Communications.  The terms of the spin-off were the following: Idearc issued shares of the Company to Verizon shareholders; it issued Senior Unsecured Notes of 2,850 mm and transferred to Verizon 2,500 mm in cash generated from the proceeds of the creations of the Tranche A and B Term Loan.

Capital Structure Most of the debt was incurred as part of the spin off and it is comprised of a Credit Agreement of 6,400 mm (Tranche A Term Loan 1,515 mm, Tranche B Term Loan 4,665 mm and Revolver 250 mm), Senior Unsecured Note of 2,850 mm, SWAP with fair value of 498 mm another SWAP with fair value of 1.9

Plan of Reorganization Owners of the 6,400 Credit Agreement will receive the pro-rated amount of a new Term Loan of 2,750 mm with a 6 years term @ LIBOR + 800 bps  95% of the post re-org new equity. Unsecured Debt holders will receive 10% of the reorganized company. Upon emergence, the Company will have 150 mm in cash and a cash Sweep will be established, with 67.5% of excess cash used to repay debt each year starting in 2010. Certain reorganization events happened in 2009 and are worth noting: the Company used 600 mm in cash available to run operations post petition and therefore no DIP financing was needed. The two swap agreements were settled for 424 mm. In April, a 250 mm payment to Secured Debt holders (188mm of principal and 62 mm in accrued interest) for adequate protection was made.  

Advertising Industry and Company’s outlook Idearc is another media Company that has been hit severely by the weakening demand in the advertising market. Among others, you can find Citadel Broadcasting, Heartland Publications, and RH Donnelly etc. Recent improvement in technologies and powerful internet search engines are replacing printed and radio advertising. On September 15, the Management forecasted the sales growth rates for the Company and for the advertising industry for the next 4 years. The outlook is grim. The demand for printed advertising, which accounts for about 85% of Idearc’s total revenue, is expected to drop double digits in the next 2 years and then stabilize at negative a 7% growth rate. However, revenue from Superpages.com, which accounts for 15% of Idearc’s total revenue, is expected to improve in the coming years with double digit growth after 2010.

Valuation The spreadsheet contains EBITDA forecasts based on the 8K filing released on September 15. Capital expenditures will be around 42 mm for 2009 and they will increase 5% each of the following year. I will assume no change in working capital for simplicity. The “Now-IRR” indicates recovery rates from the prospective of the bank lenders; therefore it indicates recovery from par. The post re-org equity assigned to the bank lenders amounts to 685 mm, and it will decrease through time as EBITDA will deteriorate. In the end of 2013, the lenders will be able to recover 84% of their principal, which is poor. But if you had bought all the bank debt in April when it was trading at 45 cents a share, then you would realize a nice 38% IRR at the end of 2010, comprised of a new 2,750 mm Term Loan, 250 mm in cash, 685 mm in equity and 303 mm in interest. Unsecured Debt holders are left with nothing basically.

Conclusion The Idearc’s new common stock that will be issued in 2010 doesn’t seem to have much appreciation potential given the current business model. If the Company can modify its operations and focus more on search engines and online advertising revenue, then EBITDA forecasts can be revised higher and maybe see more equity value in the coming years.

After days of valuation chaos, William Ackman, the founder of Pershing Square Capital Management, released a detailed report on General Growth Properties, highlighting the upside potential of the REIT and responding with vigor to the misleading valuation from Hovde Capital Advisors.  What’s genius about it is the timing. Few days ago, the Court approved a dividend the payment of 0.19 dollars a share for holders of record December 28, in order for the REIT to maintain its tax status. Today was the last day to buy the stock and still get the dividend in January 28 2010, as it will trades ex-dividend tomorrow. Realizing this, the shorts had to cover and longs had to buy, which magnified the effect of the report. It was just genius. I hope you can appreciate this reading as much as I did.

Citadel Broadcasting filed a voluntarily petition under Chapter 11 on December 20 2009 with a pre packaged restructuring plan supported by more than 60% of it secured lenders. The Company listed 2,464 mm in liabilities and 1,400 mm in assets. The First Day Motions were granted today and the Company will use 36 mm of cash on hand plus cash generated from operation to conduct business during the bankruptcy proceeding. No DIP financing will be needed.

Business Overview The Company is a major player in the radio broadcasting industry and it operates through two segments: Citadel Radio, which owns and operates radio stations across the country and accounts for two thirds of the revenue, and Citadel Media, which produces news and talk programming.

Capital Structure The Senior Revolving and Term Facility were amended for the fourth time on March 26 2009 to include a monthly EBITDA test and monthly liquidity test. The Company anticipated that it will be in compliance with its covenants through the end of 2009 (150 mm EBITDA and 25 mm in cash) but it didn’t expect to meet the financial covenants requirements on January 15 2010 (150 mm of cash on hand, 30 mm in cash anytime, postpone maturity date of convertible to on or after 2014 and Senior Secured Debt leverage of 6.75x by December 2010).

 One of the main balance sheet issues for Citadel Broadcasting is over leverage. The Company was able to do get away with high debt levels in 2007 and prior years due to lax financial covenants and lack of impairment tests of goodwill and intangibles. The Plan of Reorganization will cut 1,400 mm in debt and will address the over leverage issue, but I am not sure how happy Secured Debt holders will be. I have not worked the numbers yet, but it might take few years for them to recover their principal amount in terms of equity appreciation. I will work out a model in the coming weeks.

Plan of Reorganization  The pre petition Secured Creditors will receive a pro rata share of a new Term Loan in the principal amount of 762.5 mm with a 5 year term @ LIBOR + 800 bps and 90% of the new common stock. The Convertible Note holders will have the option to receive a pro rata share of 10% of the new common stock or cash equal to 5% of unsecured claims (capped at 2%). Common stock, preferred, options, warrants will be cancelled.

EBITDA Forecast The Company is going to end up with 180 mm in EBITDA in 2009, a 28% drop from the previous year. In the next 3 to 4 years, I expect EBITDA to grow in at 2%-3% rate each year, far away from the 11%-12% growth rate experienced in 2006-2007, after the ABC Radio merger in February 2006. Besides the economic downturn, that is still keeping advertising expenses low, the demand for advertising is shifting from radio to online technologies like Google. People surf the web more than they listen to the radio, so why should you advertise your product on the radio? On top of that, the Company recognizes six industries that generate most of revenue: automotive, retails, medical, financial, entertainment and food stores. Three out of the six are still experiencing cost cutting and low top line growth, so it’s tough to project double digits EBITDA growth levels for the coming years. Stick around for more forecasting and valuation analysis in the next few weeks.

Accuride Business Overview Accuride is a manufacturer and supplier of commercial vehicle components in North America. The products include wheels, truck body parts, seating assembly and other vehicle parts. The Company operates in a highly competitive and cyclical market as it’s largely dependent on the overall strength of the demand for heavy and medium-duty trucks.

Path to Bankruptcy The automotive industry was severely affected by the economic downturn and the prolonged lack of demand for commercial vehicle significantly affected the Company’s operations. In the 2Q of 2009, a series of temporary waivers with respect to the Credit Facility were implemented, as the Company determined that it would likely be in violation of certain financial covenants. The Company also entered in series of forbearance agreements with the Senior Subordinated holders as the interest payment due August 3^rd wasn’t honored.

Restructuring Plan After a series of negotiations, the Company reached an agreement with its creditors for a pre-packaged restructuring plan. At emergence, the Company anticipates 290.1 mm in secured debt and 435.5 mm in consolidated debt. The Plan was announced on October 8 and the terms are

• The Credit Agreement, which is the Term Facility 56.07 mm and the Revolving Credit Facility 224.6 mm, will be amended with interest of LIBOR + 675 bps maturing on June 30 2013 and an annual cash flow sweep of 75% with first sweep date on 1Q 2012 (after meeting a minimum liquidity of 25 mm a month).
• 275 mm Senior Sub 8.50% due 2015 will be cancelled and note holders will receive 98% of the common stock of the reorganized Company and 140 mm of a new Senior Convertible note.
• The new Senior Convertible note will mature in 10 years with the first six payment made PIK and the remaining payable in cash at 7.50%. Part of the proceeds from the issuance will be used to repay 70 mm of the “Last-Out” Sun Capital Loan, which is a loan outstanding under the Credit Agreement
• Equity holders will receive 2% of the new common stock and warrants to purchase up to 15% of the reorganized Company, exercisable in 2 years and only at a strike price that is 110% of par recovery on the Senior Sub notes from the day of restructuring.
• The Company secured a DIP loan consisting of 25 mm @ LIBOR + 6.750% plus another 25 mm @ LIBOR plus 7.750%, both maturing in 9 months.

Capital Structure The Company has 275 mm of Senior Sub notes due 2015, a Revenue Bond for 3 mm, a Revolving Credit for 56.07 mm and a Term Facility for 294.6 mm.  Senior Sub CUSIP 004398AE30R0 or ARUC.GD @ 8.50% due 2015

Valuation The model is basically an LBO, there is a cash flow sweep used to pay down debt and the equity value is calculated from the EV. On an 8K filed on 10/15, the Company provided very useful information about future operating earnings, and I used projected EBITDA to estimate how much FCF will be generated in the next four years. I expect working capital needs to increase up to 108 mm in 2011, and then be stable afterwards; capital expenditures will be 25 mm in 2010 and the go down to 20 mm until 2013. The Company is expecting demand to pick up significantly in the coming years, especially in 2010 and 2011, and it will need to buy inventory and sell items on credit. During peak cycle in 2005-2006, working capital was between 101 mm and 106 mm with EBITDA between 196 mm to 211 mm and capital expenditures ranging between 40.7 mm to 47.6 mm respectively. Cash at filing was 12 mm per the Affidavit from the CFO.

The Equity Value If you would be buying all the Sub notes, how much would you get in return? 98% of post re-org equity seems a lot, but it will be diluted to 50% after 4 years, assuming half of the convertible note or 70 mm will be converted upon issuance, and rest by 2012 (see the Convertible note schedule under “Assumptions” on the spreadsheet). Further dilution comes from the warrants which will be eligible to be converted into 15% of post re-org equity in 2012. Senior Sub holders will be able to recover around 50% of the principalpar value of their bonds in 2010. That doesn’t seem much but the appreciation potentialis great. In 2011, the equity will be valued at 314 mm, an annualized IRR of 23%, which includes dilution from the conversion of the Convertible note and warrants. In the years to follow, the equity grows but dilution decreases your return potential significantly. In 2013, the Company will generate almost 1,200 mm in equity but you will own only 700 mm. You could sell your investment for a 32% IRR, excluding the interest accrued on the Convertible note. Its a little light considering al the risks involved in the transaction. 

Conclusion Probably the best year to sell your investment would be 2012, as one more year will not give you much more return. You can buy the Senior Sub @ 85 cents on the dollar and 2 years after emergence you will get a 31% IRR annualized on your equity value, which includes the conversion of 100 mm of the Convertible note, but excludes interest on the convertible note. It’s a good plan of reorganization for the Company as leverage decreases and equity increases significantly over the years but dilution creates a drag on investors’ returns.

Emergence from Bankruptcy The US Bankruptcy Court has approved today, December 8^th, the plan of reorganization that CIT Group proposed to its creditors. The Company is now expected to emerge from bankruptcy by mid-December. This is an overview on the plan of reorganization that CIT Group offered to different bond classes:

Series A and B Notes The company will issue two new notes in exchange for the old notes:

Characteristics: Series A note 7% coupon with maturities ranging from 2013 to 2017

Series B note 9% coupon with maturities ranging from 2013 to 2017.

Collateral: Series A and B are guaranteed by a lien on all CIT Group personal properties excluding interest in CIT Bank, certain equity interests in foreign subsidiaries (it’s unspecified which one) and other regulated subsidiaries.

Ranking: the collateral securing Series A and B notes is the same as the collateral securing the Senior Credit Facility but the lien of Series A and B collateral is subordinated to the lien of the Senior Credit Facility collateral.

Redemption: Each note will be callable @ 103.5 on Jan 1 2011 and @ 102 on Jan 2012 at the option of the issuer.

Covenants: The indenture of the new notes contain certain covenants that limit the Company’s ability to incur additional debt, pay dividends or repurchase debt or equity, merge with other companies, engage in transaction with affiliates.

Bond Classes Assuming holders of each bond class accept the plan, they will receive respectively:

Class 6 Letter of Credit – a payment of 103 cents on the dollar

Class 7 Canadian Senior Unsecured – 100% of series B note

Class 8 Long dated Senior Unsecured – 70 cents on the dollar of Series A note and 3.6% of new common interest

Class 9 Senior Unsecured – 70 cents of Series A note and 77.7% of new common interest

Class 10 Senior Unsecured Term – 70 cents of Series A note 1% of new equity common interest

Class 11 Senior Unsecured Credit Agreement – 70 cents of Series A note and 9.4% of new common interest

Class 12 Senior Sub – 7.5% of new common interest 

Class 13 Junior Sub- 0.8% of new common interest

Common interest will be cancelled and bondholders will own 100% of the post re-org company.

Post Re-org Price Class 9 holders are the largest creditors with 25,504 mm of principal outstanding and will own 77.7% of the post re-org Company. But how much is that percentage in share amount? The offering memorandum informs me that the estimated recovery on the note 94.4%, so if I am getting 70 cents on the dollar of the new note, there are still 24.4 cents that I am missing to arrive at the 94.4% recovery rate. The post- re-org equity will fill that gap. Assuming all bond classes accept the plan, the reorganized company will have 8,000 mm in equity, which is disclosed in the company memorandum, and will issue 200 mm in new shares to replace the current 400 mm shares outstanding per today’s press release. This will gives me a price of 40 per share. Is that reasonable? It is. If I am a buyer of all Class 9 debt, then I will get 155.4 mm shares of the new company (77.7% of 200 mm) and each Class 9 bondholder will get 6.09 shares which equals $240 (6 shares + cash). The math turns out perfectly, $700 of the new bond + $240 of new equity = $940 which is close to the recovery rate of 94.4% provided on the offering memorandum.

Series B notes There is a good chance that the Series B will go to par upon emergence. If you bought a Class 9 note in November at 70 cents on the dollar and you choose to participate in the plan of reorganization, you are definitely getting a great deal.

After 6 month of trading, your note can easily be trading par and the new equity at 50 per share, which gives you an annualized IRR of 17.5% without accounting for interest payments.

GGWPQ Distressed Investment Just a few weeks ago I introduced General Growth Properties as a great opportunity to capitalize on distressed investing. The following analysis will unlock the equity value hidden behind the mall giant currently operating under the guidelines of Chapter 11.

Debtors vs. non-debtors General Growth Properties has been releasing a monthly operating report; an 8K filing required by US Bankruptcy Laws, indicating the debtors’ operating performance, working capital and assets/liabilities levels. It’s a very useful report and it shows how much profit the Company has generated post-petition. The report excludes operating performance, assets and liabilities of non-debtors; as such entities are operating outside of the provision of Chapter 11. However, the debtors’ ownership in such entities is disclosed and it’s reported as “investment in controlled non-debtors” on the balance sheet and earnings/losses from such entities are reported under “income/loss of unconsolidated real estate affiliates” on the income statement.

Valuation With the information provided on the post-petition monthly operating report along with the cash flow forecast released on May 22, I was able to come up with a model that estimates General Growth Properties’ price upon emergence in June 2010. From the filing date up to October 31^st, the debtors generated 960 mm in NOI, which is calculated as total revenue minus real estate taxes minus repairs and maintenance minus property operating costs. At emergence, the Company will have produced 1,700 mm in NOI in the worst case scenario and 2,040 mm or 20% more, in the best case scenario. I used a 10% capitalization rate to arrive at the EV, which is conservative considering that Simon Property Group (SPG) is currently trading with a 9.00% cap rate and that’s expected to drop to 8.50% in 2010 and 8.00% in 2011 based on projected NOI and EV. Remember that just a couple of years ago, REITs used to be valued with a 7.50%-8.00% cap rate. The total EV, including non-debtors, will be 17,900 mm in the worst case scenario and 21,480 mm on the best case scenario. I estimated that non-debtors will contribute from 90 mm to108 mm in NOI.

Post-petition cash flow The 8K released on May 22, 2009 provides a nice cash flow forecast on a consolidated basis, which includes debtors and non-debtors. The Company will generate 2,172 mm in cash from operations which includes revenue from mall/offices, Master Planned Communities and property management fees. Financing related expenses will amount to 1,097 mm, which include a cash inflow from the DIP loan of 400 mm and DIP related expenses like a commitment fee of 15 mm, a 3.00% exit fee and interest charges. Inclusive is a charge of 213 mm related to the repayment of the Goldman Loan and various interest charges and principal amortizations. Other expenses are working capital and restructuring fees that will amount to 661 mm and 156 mm. The net cash flow balance from petition date up to emergence on June 2010 will be 426 mm.

Equity Value The total EV available to secured creditors is the sum of the debtors’ residual value and investments in non-debtors, which are assets that operate outside of the provision of Chapter 11. Secured creditors are mortgages secured by properties and unsecured creditors represent outstanding notes like the 2,245 mm of Rouse Bonds, 1,550 mm of GGP LP Notes, 206 mm TRUPS and 2,577.5 mm in revolver and term loan. The Junior Sub notes were repurchased with the proceeds from the sale of TRUPS. The residual equity value ranges from 9,040 mm to 12,620 mm, which is enormous given the fact that the Company is in financial distress. But this is a unique case of bankruptcy, where non-debtors’ assets account for a large part of the company, which is why the equity is trading at almost 10 dollars a share. But I believe there is more upside from the current level, and in the worst case scenario, the Company will be trading at 29 dollars per share, an annualized IRR of 43% from today’s closing price of 9.50 dollars a share.

Related Posts on this Blog:

Undervalued equity: General Growth Properties (GGWPQ)

Chemtura Corp Chapter 11 recovery analysis

CIT Group Bankruptcy and CIT-PZ

Company Overview Chemtura Corp is a manufacturer and marketer of specialty chemical products, most of which sold to industrial manufacturing customers for use as additives, ingredients or intermediates that add value to their end products. The Company operates on a global scale with 52% of last year sales coming from outside the United States.

Path to Bankruptcy In the 4Q of 2008, Chemtura experienced an unprecedented reduction in orders as the global recession deepened. Liquidity also deteriorated as the availability of financing under the European Receivable Facility decreased significantly due to the Company’s weak financial performance and it was eventually terminated in the 2Q of 2009. On January 2009, the US Facility was formed for the purpose of selling receivables and restoring most of the liquidity that was available in the previous quarter. However, sales and the overall financial performance deteriorated further in the first part of 2009, resulting in the company’s inability to be in compliance with two maintenance covenants under its Amended and Restated 2007 Credit Facility. On December 2008, the Company obtained a 90-day waiver of compliance with the covenants from the lenders under the 2007 Credit Facility. When Chemtura realized that it wasn’t able to refinance its 370 mm notes due in July 15, it filed for bankruptcy on March 18 2009. Foreign subsidiaries and certain US subsidiaries were not included in the filings. The Company is expected to file a plan of reorganization by February 15 2010, after the court already granted two extensions.

Capital Structure As of petition date, there are 1,020 mm of unsecured debt and 199 mm of secured debt, for a total of 1,229 mm.

Advances under the 2007 Credit Facility were originally set to 300 mm, but after it was amended on December 30 2008, the maximum allowed was reduced to 190 mm. The 2009 Notes (GLK.GA) are obligations of Great Lakes Chemical Corp, a wholly owned subsidiary of Chemtura Corp. The 2016 Notes (HTRA.GA) are obligations of certain domestic subsidiaries of Chemtura Corp, but may be released from their subsidiary guarantees under certain circumstances (exhibit 10.1 10Q filing on May 10 2006). The 2026 Debentures (CK.GE) are obligations of Chemtura Corp, the parent company, and therefore junior compared to the other notes.  The 2009 US Facility was terminated on March 23 as a condition of the debtor entering into 400 mm DIP Lending Agreement.  All receivables were sold back to the Company by purchasers for the amount of 117 mm. The CFO for 2009 already contains that charge.

Valuation For the nine months ending in September 30, the Company accumulated 169 mm in EBITDA and it will earn approximately 210 mm for the entire year. During Chemtura’s peak cycle 2005-2007, EBITDA ranged from 350 mm to 400 mm, which is not possible in this environment as demand remains weak, therefore I expect EBITDA for 2010 to be 210 mm on the conservative side, and 20% higher to 250 mm on the aggressive side. EV is calculated with a 4.5 multiple, which is conservative considering that the company never traded around these levels, but rivals like DOW and DD, traded around 5.2 and 6.2 during their peak cycles in 2005-2007. For the nine months ending in September 2009, CFO was 26 mm and it will be approximately 50 mm for the year with 60 mm in capex. For 2010, I expect the company to generate 60 mm in CFO with 90 mm in capex. Historically, capex has been around 110 mm a year with a CFO of 150 mm in 2007 and 250 mm in 2006. Keep in mind that results before 2005 are not directly comparable to more recent results due to the inclusion of operating results of Great Lakes, subsequent to the merger on July 2005.

Recovery Analysis Unsecured debt holders, excluding the 2026 Debentures, are getting 100 cents on the dollar if EV is higher then 1,035 mm in 2010. In fact, the 2009 and 2016 Notes are now trading around 107 cents on the dollar and 2026 Debentures are trading around 78 cents on the dollar, which implies that investors are expecting an EV on the high end of my valuation, around 245-250 mm. There seems to be no equity value left after restructuring at this moment, but if the company earns more then 210 mm in EBITDA for 2009 and expects to earn mote then 270 mm in EBITDA for 2010, I would be a buyer of the 2026 Debentures and the equity as well, which is now trading at 70 cents under CEMJQ.