Archive for March, 2010

The role of the Equity Committee

In recent months, several high –profile bankruptcy cases saw a high involvement from shareholders represented by a formal Equity Committee. The formation of an ad hoc committee representing the owners of the Company appears to have recently taken the US bankruptcy world by storm and will likely impact how future restructurings are handled. If bankruptcy is a tool that creditors use to protect their interest, should shareholders have similar rights in these proceedings?

Rational for an Equity Committee

According to the absolute priority rule in the Bankruptcy Code, shareholders are forced to the bottom of the capital structure. However, if the Debtor still maintains a viable business, all stakeholders want to obtain some value from the reorganized entity. Equity participants believe that their interest are not adequately protected in bankruptcy and therefore feel it necessary to appoint a formal Committee. The US Bankruptcy Code doesn’t provide any assurance of “adequate protection” and the degree of protection for shareholders is determined on a case by case basis. Usually solvency is the “make-or-break” feature regarding the appointment of an Equity Committee.

The concept of solvency

The Board of Directors of a Corporation has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders. However, when a Company becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty now extends to its creditors. Solvency is the most used applicable legal standard when deciding whether or not to appoint an Equity Committee. If the Debtor is hopeless insolvent, justification can be made that there is no need for shareholder representation, as the cost required and charged to the bankrupt estate for professional representation of the shareholders outweighs the adequate representation interest of the shareholders and it would be burdensome to the bankrupt estate. Usually an Equity Committee  can only exercise a meaningful weight on the restructuring process when bankruptcy is not the result of insolvency.

Role of the Equity Committee

Similarly to the Creditors Committee, the Equity Committee participates in the restructuring process and communicates with the Debtor, Advisors and other stakeholders, negotiate specific terms and conditions relating to the Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization (POR) and participate in the confirmation of the POR. The goal of the Equity Committee, along with the Creditors Committee, is to maximize value and to divide that value in order to satisfy all stakeholders. To accomplish their goal, Equity Committees typically try to:

ü  Be involved as early as possible in the case in order to have more negotiation power

ü  Ensure an open communication with all stakeholders, specially the Debtor and its Advisors in order to limit litigation costs

ü  Ensure the debtor is awarded the maximum value of the enterprise

Recent cases

The Equity Committee has the potential to promote conflicts regarding the valuation of the enterprise, assigning a higher valuation to the estate and therefore diluting the value to creditors. It can be argued that the increasing involvement of Equity Committees in the restructuring process has been a liability for Creditors. Let’s look at General Growth Property’s case for example; here the Equity Committee probably has more weight on the restructuring process than the Creditors, even if they are forced to the bottom of the capital structure.  Another meaningful example is Accuride Carp case. On February 9, shareholders won a delay of the company’s reorganization schedule to develop an alternative plan that includes new $400 million exit loan. One major point of the dispute was valuation. The shareholders claimed the Company is worth about 823 mm, or 260 mm more than what was estimated by the Creditors.  Shareholders would receive 26.5% of the new equity, instead of 2% under the original plan. The battle is still ongoing in court.


Some thoughts over GGP 4Q earnings

Based on the 4Q earnings released few days ago,  we have the following updated information:

2009 full year NOI = 2,417 mm
Total debt = 27,815 mm

Given its current stock price of 13.50, and using FY 2009 NOI, GGP trades at an implied cap rate of 7.50%:

NOI = 2,417 mm
Debt = 27,815 mm
Equity value = 13.50 x 314 mm shares = 4,239 mm
Enterprise value = debt + equity = 27,815 mm + 4,239 mm = 32,054 mm
Implied cap rate = 2,417 mm/ 32,04o mm = 7.54%

SPG, on the other hand, trades at an implied cap rate of 6.75%.

The quality difference between SPG and GGP’s portfolio’s is marginal. SPG’s overall quality is slightly higher but GGP owns higher quality assets. If SPG wants to purchase GGP, then it must bid to an implied cap rate that better reflects the value of an A quality portfolio. Realistically, a 7.00% implied cap rate is a fair value for GGP. Arguably, if you want to purchase it, you must bid a premium; therefore a 6.75% implied cap rate should be warranted.

At a 7.00% implied cap rate:

Enterprise value = NOI / implied cap rate = 2,417 mm / 7.00% = 34,528 mm
Equity Value = Enterprise value – total debt = 34,528 mm – 27,815 mm= 6,713 mm
Stock price = Equity value / total shares = 6,713 mm / 314 mm shares = 21.38

A 10 bps reduction in cap rate, it implies a stock price of 22.97, which means that a 10 bps adjustment in cap rate affects the stock price by 1.60. That’s significant.

The management of the Debtor cannot allow SPG to steal the Company at their initial bid of $9 which corresponds to an implied cap rate of 8.00%. This will be a catastrophe not only for GGP shareholders but for the CRE market as well. It would mean that cap rates based on recent deals have increased, therefore decreasing the value of the stocks in the REIT industry.

20-25 dollars per share is a more plausible bid for GGP’s assets.


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